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ABSTRACT 
Mixed regimes are often viewed as inherently less stable and more war prone 
than fully democratic or autocratic systems due to their low levels of 
institutionalization. I ask, are certain mixed regimes more or less war prone than 
other mixed regimes, based on the strength and orientation (more democratic or 
autocratic) of their political institutions? At ends with previous research, my 
findings suggest that institutionalization levels play little, if any role in the onset of 
interstate war.  
 
INDEX WORDS: Anocracy, COW, Institutionalization, Mixed regime, Regime 
completeness, Stability, War 
	   	  
	  
 
 
REGIME COMPLETENESS AND CONFLICT: A CLOSER LOOK AT 
ANOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
 
by 
 
MATTHEW J. SCHIPANI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Masters of Arts 
In the College of Arts of Sciences 
Georgia State University 
2010 
	   	  
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Matthew Joseph Schipani 
2010 
	   	  
	  
REGIME COMPLETENESS AND CONFLICT: A CLOSER LOOK AT 
ANOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
 
by 
 
MATTHEW J. SCHIPANI 
 
 
 
Committee Chairs:  John S. Duffield 
Charles R. Hankla 
 
Committee: Ryan E. Carlin 
 
 
Electronic Version Approved:  
 
 
Office of Graduate Studies 
College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
December 2010
	   	  
	  
iv	  
DEDICATION 
In dedication to my loving family for their constant encouragement and support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   	  
	  
v	  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank Drs John S. Duffield, Charles R. Hankla, and Ryan E. Carlin 
for their guidance and patience throughout this endeavor. Special thanks to Drs 
Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder for allowing me to use their data, and 
last, but certainly not least, thanks to all my colleagues and peers at Georgia 
State University for their advice and input on this project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   	  
	  
vi	  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWEDGEMENTS  v 
LIST OF TABLES   vii 
1 INTRODUCTION                                                           1  
2 THE LITERATURE                 2  
3 THE THEORY                4  
4 THE HYPOTHESES             11 
5 THE DESIGN              13  
6 THE RESULTS              17  
7 CONCLUSION              27 
WORK CITED               29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   	  
	  
vii	  
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Logit Estimates of the Effects of Institutionalization on War        19     
           
Table 2: Logit Estimates of War Proneness Across Regime Type using             25 
Domestic Authority to Measure Institutionalization Levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   	  
	  
1	  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 The dyadic democratic peace provides compelling evidence that 
democratic states are more pacific in their interstate relations, at least towards 
similar systems. That no two democracies have engaged in war with one another 
has many, especially in the West, advocating for the proliferation of democratic 
institutions and norms as a means of securing world peace (Doyle, 1983; Owen, 
1997). While a world full of democracies is likely to be less conflictual, the short-
term impacts of such a transition would likely lead to sharp increases in interstate 
conflict due to the bellicose nature of mixed regimes (Mansfield and Snyder, 
1995, 2002, 2002, 2007). 
 When discussing conflict proneness, much of the debate focuses on the 
democracy/autocracy dichotomy, while mixed regimes, or anocracies, are often 
an afterthought. This is unfortunate, given their prevalence, and more conflictual 
nature (relative to complete autocracies and democracies). Between 1817 and 
1997, there have been a total of 9,863 country years. Of these 9,863 
observations, there have been 4,134 monadic country years where states have 
been considered mixed (42 percent). Over this same time period, there have 
been 398 monadic country years where an external war has occurred. Of these 
398 observations, mixed regimes were involved in 148 monadic country years of 
war (37 percent) (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002, 2009; Sarkees, 2000).  
 Obviously, anocratic political systems are fairly widespread and war  
prone. Unfortunately, we know very little about them since they are usually  
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discussed in relation to full democracies and/or full autocracies. To better 
understand the behavior of anocratic systems, I examine them in relation to each 
other. Are certain types of anocratic regimes more or less conflict prone than 
other types of anocratic regimes? Is the strength of political institutions an 
important factor? The rest of this paper will be spent attempting to answer these 
questions.  
 
2. The Literature 
  That anocracies are more conflict prone than either complete 
democracies or complete autocracies is a pretty common, widely accepted 
supposition (Gurr, 1974; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2007; Rose 
and Shin, 2001; Hegre, 2001; Marshall and Gurr, 2003; Gates et. al., 2004). The 
source of this behavior is slightly more contested.  
 Anocratic political systems posses a mix of both democratic and autocratic 
attributes. Going off of Mansfield and Snyderʼs criteria, in mixed regimes leaders 
are accountable to factions and/or groups outside of the ruling elite. Who can 
participate in the political process, and how they are able to participate is 
restricted. Typically, there are elections of some kind, but they fall to meet the 
high standards of competitiveness and fairness found in democratic systems  
(Mansfield and Snyder, 2007). In other words, institutions that regulate political 
processes in anocratic systems are relatively weak.  
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 System instability is the most prevalent explanation of conflict proneness  
within mixed regimes, and is often attributed to weak institutions (Huntington, 
1968; Rose and Shin, 2001). Without consolidated institutions to regulate political 
participation and elections, elites may employ nationalist sentiments to gain 
public support, which may than lead to conflict due to the bellicose nature of their 
rhetoric (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002, 2002, 2007). Another institutional 
explanation posits that democratic and autocratic states are more stable because 
of the presence of self-enforcing equilibria. In these systems, elites have an 
incentive to perpetuate the status quo (they are, after all, the ones holding a 
majority of the power), and the easiest way to do this is by maintaining their 
political institutions. This type of self-enforcing equilibria is not present in 
anocratic systems, which means there is no incentive for elites to maintain 
institutions, which in turn makes them less stable and more prone to conflict 
(Gates et. al., 2004).  
 The bellicose nature of anocratic systems has also been explained as a 
function of their lack of “persistence” and “adaptability,” where persistence refers 
to the amount of time a system has gone without an abrupt change in its authority 
patterns, and adaptability refers to “minor and gradual major changes in authority 
characteristics” (Gurr, 1974, pg. 1492). Democratic states are more persistent 
and adaptable because they are more responsive to public opinion, and 
autocratic systems are more persistent and adaptable because they effectively 
allocate resources and coercive forces against discontented citizens. Anocratic 
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systems lack both attributes because they are unable to perform either of these 
functions effectively, making them less stable and more conflict prone (Gurr, 
1974) 
The previous scholarship on anocratic regimes has been myopic at best. 
The weak institutions argument does not take the variation in anocratic systems 
into account because it treats anocracy as a dichotomous variable. While this 
relationship may be robust in the aggregate, it is likely that the effects of stability 
across anocratic regimes will differ depending on the orientation and strength of 
certain institutions. In other words, anocratic systems are not differentiated from 
other anocratic systems; either youʼre a mixed regime, or you arenʼt. Just as no 
two democratic or autocratic systems are exactly the same, no two anocratic 
systems are identical. To truly grasp the extent of this variation, anocratic 
systems must be disaggregated and then examined in relation to one another on 
the basis of institutional strength.  
 
3. The Theory 
 I contend that while anocratic political systems may tend to be more war 
prone than democratic or authoritarian regimes, certain types of anocracies will 
be less war prone than others, depending on the strength of the systemʼs 
institutions. The primary purpose of any government is to maintain central 
authority, control policy (both domestic and foreign), and provide governance 
(Marshall and Gurr, 2003). While the majority of anocratic systems are unlikely to 
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perform any of these functions as effectively and/or efficiently as complete 
political systems, some will perform them better than others.   
 Much of the discussion dealing with the democracy/autocracy debate 
focuses on the substantive variation between the two. For example, the monadic 
democratic peace theory contends that democratic states are less likely to 
engage in any wars (Danilovic and Clare, 2007), suggesting that democracies 
tend to be more pacific in their relations with all states. While this variation is of 
obvious importance, democratic and autocratic states are in many ways 
functionally similar, since the variation between these systems often leads to the 
same end result: states with strong institutions, and subsequently, greater 
stability. In the current context, states that posses these characteristics (higher 
levels of institutionalization and stability) are considered complete regimes (e.g. 
democracies and autocracies are complete systems), while states that do not are 
considered to be less complete or incomplete. In other words, mixed regimes 
tend to be less complete or incomplete systems, since they generally posses 
lower levels of institutionalization and stability.    
 To focus solely on completeness as a function of strong institutions and 
stability would be shortsighted. The substantive variation between regime types 
does matter. Drawing on the previous example of the monadic democratic peace, 
if democratic states tend to be more pacific in all of their interstate relations, then 
we can expect that less complete anocratic states that fall more towards the 
democratic side of the political spectrum will be less war prone than anocratic 
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states that are more autocratic. In other words, the degree of regime 
completeness and the orientation (e.g. towards democracy or autocracy) of a 
mixed regime should impact the stateʼs propensity for war.  
 This argument assumes that mixed regimes are less complete or 
incomplete systems, relative to democratic and autocratic states. Unfortunately, 
this is not true of all anocratic systems. Some states have remained mixed for 
extended periods of time, and have consolidated their political institutions. In 
other words, some mixed regimes are complete, or at least near complete 
systems (this is discussed in more detail below). Here, I concede that not all 
anocratic states are necessarily less complete or incomplete, but for the 
purposes of my theory, I assume that they are.  
 Recent scholarship on anocratic systems can help illustrate this point. For 
instance, Levitsky and Way (2002) argue that in competitive authoritative 
regimes, autocratic governments and democratic political institutions can coexist 
indefinitely, as long as the ruling elite “avoid[s] egregious (and well-publicized) 
rights abuses and do not cancel or openly steal elections” 1 (pg. 51-52). In other 
words, the inherent contradictions between autocratic governance and 
democratic institutions are mitigated, so long as the ruling elite avoids grandiose 
violations of democratic norms. By employing various “legal” forms of persecution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1.	  Competitive	  authoritarian	  states	  are	  those	  systems	  where	  the	  minimum	  criteria	  for	  democracy	  exist	  (e.g.	  open	  and	  free	  elections	  of	  the	  legislature	  and	  executive,	  a	  majority	  of	  adults	  can	  vote,	  political	  rights	  and	  civil	  liberties	  are	  protected,	  and	  elected	  officials	  posses	  the	  authority	  needed	  to	  govern),	  but	  are	  violated	  to	  the	  point	  where	  an	  unequal	  playing	  field	  between	  incumbents	  and	  the	  opposition	  is	  created.	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(e.g. bribery and co-optation), incumbents are able to stymie the opposition while 
avoiding public dissent and international scrutiny (Levitsky and Way, 2002).  
 In her 2008 book, Political Institutions Under Dictatorship, Gandhi makes a 
similar argument. In authoritarian states, dictators face two barriers to 
governance: the need to gain cooperation from at least some segments of 
society, and the need to subvert any potential opposition. To address both 
barriers, authoritarian leaders can use nominally democratic institutions, which 
allow leaders to effectively share power and make policy concessions. By 
providing a forum, these institutions act as an outlet for oppositions to effect 
change, even if that effect is minimal, and allow ruling elites to contain demands. 
In effect, Gandhi argues that incorporating democratic institutions into an 
authoritative system allows dictators to consolidate their power and increase 
stability by offering an outlet to discontented groups, even if that outlet is 
ineffective (Gandhi, 2008).  
 Both Levitsky and Way, and Gandhi make cogent arguments, but neither 
of them really challenges the association between mixed regimes and low levels 
of institutionalization. Levitsky and Way even concede that “the coexistence of 
democratic rules and autocratic methods aimed at keeping incumbents in power 
creates an inherent source of instability” ((Levitsky and Way, 2002; pg. 59). Also, 
both arguments deal with very specific types of mixed regimes, not anocratic 
systems in the aggregate, which have been shown by many to have weaker 
political institutions (Gurr, 1974; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002a, 2002b, 
2007; Gates et. al., 2004).   
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 Levitsky and Wayʼs conception of competitive authoritative regimes, and 
Gandhiʼs democratic dictatorships represent the exceptions to the rule. I contend 
that mixed regimes in general tend to posses lower levels of institutionalization. 
Looking at authority patterns in democratic and autocratic states will help to 
justify this relationship. Authority in democratic states is generally spread across 
several political institutions (e.g., the legislature, executive, and courts), which 
limits the potential gains of subversion (e.g., incumbents trying to maintain office 
after being voted out). Conversely, in autocratic states authority tends to be 
concentrated in the executive (ideally), which prevents the opposition from 
gaining “access to channels of political power” (Gates et. al., 2006; pg. 895). Both 
lead to higher degrees of stability in their respective systems. In anocratic states, 
authority is not diffuse enough to prevent the democratic process from being 
subverted, and not concentrated enough to restrict potential opposition (Gates et. 
al., 2006). In other words, political institutions in mixed regimes tend to be weak 
and ineffective. 
 The degree of institutionalization matters insofar as it influences system 
stability (Huntington, 1968; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002, 2002, 2007).  
Political institutions regulate and legitimize the political process. As a state 
democratizes,	  both social and economic changes occur, that “extend political 
consciousness, multiply political demands, and broaden political participation” 
(Huntington, 1968, pg. 5). This is problematic because in transitioning states 
traditional sources of political authority are weak, and new sources lack 
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legitimacy and are ineffective. This can be attributed to public demands for 
inclusion outpacing the development of the political organizations that were 
designed to regulate it. As the gap between public demands and effective 
regulation widens, political instability will occur (Huntington, 1968; Mansfield and 
Snyder, 1995, 2002, 2002, 2007).  
 The recent (and ongoing) global recession can help illustrate this point. 
The United States is, by all accounts, a complete democratic system. Political 
institutionalization and organization is high. Going off of Huntingtonʼs criteria, 
American institutions are adaptable (older institutions that are functionally 
adaptable to change), complex, autonomous, and coherent (unified), and these 
types of institutionalized political organizations regulate economic and political 
processes with great efficacy (at least in relation to states with lesser degrees of 
institutionalization). In the context of the global recession, American institutions 
absorbed at least some of the shock, and insulated the American public, at least 
to an extent, through programs such as TARP. I am not arguing in favor or 
against such programs, but rather, am acknowledging that a significant, 
potentially destabilizing crisis occurred, and the reaction to this crisis (i.e., 
government programs) provided at least some mitigation. The question is, could 
a state with moderately institutionalized political organizations, such as those 
found in an anocratic system, provide this same level of mitigation, thereby 
maintaining stability? The ongoing political and economic turmoil in Thailand 
suggests that the answer to this question is most likely no.  
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 Thailand has been in crisis since the 2006 ousting of then Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra. Protests and riots have been a common occurrence over 
the last few years, with the rural poor supporting the deposed Shinawatra (the 
Reds), and practically everyone else in favor of his ousting (the Yellows). Violent 
demonstrations across the country led to the institution of emergency rule in May 
of 2010. Economically, Thailand has suffered its worst downturn in history, 
contracting by as much as 6 percent quarterly. The tourist industry, one of the 
stateʼs key revenue sources, declined significantly due to all the protesting 
(“BBC,” 2009; Head, 2009).  
 The ongoing political and civil unrest, along with the severity of the 
economic downturn, are largely a function of Thailandʼs weak political institutions. 
In states with highly institutionalized political organizations, leaders generally are 
not deposed by military coups. In the case of Thailand, the ensuing political 
turmoil hindered government responses to the economic downturn, which 
increased the severity of the crisis. While the recession had deep and lasting 
effects on the United States, the strength of American institutions and the 
subsequent system stability made it easier for the government to effectively 
respond.  
 The next (and final) link in out causal chain bridges the gap between 
stability and war. Previous scholarship has shown that there is a strong 
correlation between low levels of system stability and high levels of war 
proneness (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2007; Rose and Shin, 
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2001; Hegre, 2001; Marshall and Gurr, 2003; Gates et. al., 2004). Most of the 
theories dealing with this correlation were discussed earlier in this paper. I 
contend that, when taken together, these explanations provide compelling 
evidence of this relationship. In other words, anocratic systems are more war 
prone due to the bellicose nature of elite rhetoric, the lack of self-enforcing 
equilibria, their unresponsiveness towards public opinion, and their ineffective 
use of resources against discontented subjects (Gurr, 1974; Mansfield and 
Snyder, 1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2007; Gates et. al., 2004).  
  
4. Hypotheses 
 In my causal chain, low levels of institutionalization result in lower levels of 
system stability, which lead to higher levels of war proneness. The degree of 
institutionalization is largely a function of regime completeness. Fully democratic  
and autocratic states are complete systems, and therefore posses the strongest 
political organizations, while anocratic states are less complete. To help illustrate 
this point, imagine an eleven-point scale where zero represents the lowest 
possible level of institutionalization and ten represents the highest. As a state 
moves along this scale, its institutions grow stronger as it approaches ten, where 
ten represents perfect democracy or perfect autocracy and zero represents 
perfect anocracy. 
 As a state becomes more complete (moves towards ten on our scale), we 
expect system stability to increase with institutionalization. We should therefore 
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see a smaller propensity towards war in relatively more complete anocratic 
systems. Conversely, anocratic states that are less complete should have a 
relatively higher propensity towards war. This leads to my first hypothesis. 
 
 H1: More complete anocracies (those possessing higher degrees of 
 institutionalization and stability) are less war prone than less  
 complete anocratic systems.    
 
 The degree of regime completeness is not the only factor that must be 
considered, however. The substantive variation between regime types has been 
shown to influence state behavior. The monadic democratic peace theory 
suggests that democratic systems are more pacific in their relations with all 
states because of democratic norms and institutions (Danilovic and Clare, 2007). 
Since some anocratic systems are likely to be more democratic than others, the 
monadic democratic peace has implications here. This leads to my second 
hypotheses.  
  
 H2: Anocratic states that fall more towards the democratic side 
 of the political spectrum will be less war prone than anocratic 
 states that fall towards the autocratic side.   
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5. The Design  
 I contend that mixed regimes tend to have relatively weaker political 
institutions, weak institutions lead to lower levels of system stability, and less 
stable states are more likely to engage in wars. Since both levels of 
institutionalization and stability are in the causal chain, including both in the same 
model would be problematic. I therefore test only the first (institutionalization) and 
last link (war) in my theory, assuming that my model captures the impacts of 
stability. To test my hypotheses, I employ Mansfield and Snyderʼs data from their 
2002 article, Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War. The unit of 
analysis is monadic country year. Using this data, I estimate the following  
model: 2 
 
€ 
Warit = α + β1Institutionalizationi( t−1) + β2Institutionalization2i( t−1) + β3Majpowerit +
β4Civwarit + β5Initiatorit +ε it  
 
 My dependent variable is war (coded WAR). I use Mansfield and Snyderʼs 
data, which measures war as the log odds that state i engages in external war at 
time t, where a one indicates war and a zero indicates otherwise. For the 
operationalization, data from the Correlates of War is utilized. The COW data 
considers two types of external war, which is defined as conflict between state i 
and a foreign enemy. International war is the first type, which is classified as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   2.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Mansfield	  and	  Snyder	  use	  a	  variable	  that	  measures	  the	  concentration	  of	  a	  state’s	  capabilities,	  which	  I	  chose	  not	  to	  include	  in	  my	  model.	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conflict between two members of the international system that results in a 
minimum of one thousand battlefield fatalities. Those states that endure at least 
one hundred battlefield deaths, or commit a minimum of one thousand troops to 
combat are considered participants. Extra-systemic war is the second type, and 
is defined as imperial actions where a member of the international system and a 
non-state actor engage in conflict. The threshold for extra-systemic wars is also 
set at one thousand battlefield deaths. To be considered a participant, a state 
must sustain one thousand battlefield deaths every year over the duration of the 
conflict. Over the course of the period examined (1816-1992), and based on the 
aforementioned criteria, eighty-eight different states have engaged 79 
international wars and 108 extra-systemic wars, for a total of 398 monadic 
country years in which an external war occurred (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002a, 
2005; Sarkees, 2000). 3 
 In regards to institutionalization levels, I use measurements of regime type 
as a proxy. Since the strength of a systemʼs political organizations is a function of 
regime completeness, and the degree of completeness is measured by regime 
scores, I expect these scores to capture variation in institutionalization levels. I 
employ the Polity iV projectʼs revised combined polity scores, coded Polity2, 
since they offer a comprehensive measure of regime characteristics.  
The Polity iV revised combined polity scores are taken in two parts based 
on the democratic and autocratic characteristics of a regime, and scores are then 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   3.	  States	  are	  only	  coded	  one	  for	  the	  initial	  year	  of	  hostilities.	  For	  instance,	  the	  United	  States	  is	  coded	  1	  in	  1941,	  when	  the	  U.S.	  entered	  WWII,	  but	  is	  coded	  0	  in	  1942.	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added together. The democratic score is based on the presence of political 
institutions that allow citizens to express preferences, institutional constraints on 
the executive, and civil liberties. The autocratic score is based on the level of 
competitive political participation, executive selection, and the level of institutional 
constraints on the executive. The polity scores are on a scale from -10 to 10. The 
closer a state is to -10, the more autocratic it is, and the closer a state is to 10, 
the more democratic it is. As a state approaches zero, it becomes more mixed 
and less complete (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002).  
 I expect the association between institutionalization levels and war to be 
non-linear, based on my previous theoretical justifications. At the highest levels of 
institutionalization (-10 and 10), war should be least likely, and as a state 
becomes less complete (approaches 0), I expect the likelihood of war to 
increase. This should result in an inverted “U” shaped relationship, where the 
base of the two legs indicates the highest levels of institutionalization and the 
lowest propensity towards war, and is represented by complete democracies and 
autocracies, while the peak indicates the lowest levels of institutionalization and 
the highest propensity towards war, and is represented by incomplete anocracy. 
Since I expect anocratic systems that fall more towards the democratic side of 
the political spectrum to be less war prone, this U shaped relationship will not be 
perfectly symmetrical. To model this relationship, I include the composite polity 
scores and the composite polity scores squared  
 In addition to institutionalization levels, I also include three control  
	   	  
	  
16	  
variables in my model: major powers, civil war, and initiator. Each will be  
discussed in turn.  
 First, I include Mansfield and Snyderʼs control variable for the presence of 
a major power in the international system (coded Majpower). It has been shown 
that major powers are more likely to engage in wars, relative to weaker states. 
Using this control allows me to differentiate between the likelihood of states that 
engage in war due to their greater relative strength, and the likelihood that states 
engage in war due to their level of institutionalization.  The major power variable 
is dichotomous, and it is coded one if a state is a major power and a zero 
otherwise (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002a, 2005; Sarkees, 2000).  
 I also include Mansfield and Snyderʼs control variable for the presence of 
civil war (coded CivWar). It is important to account for civil war since previous 
research has shown that intrastate conflicts can affect the outbreak of interstate 
wars (see Snyder 2000). Civil war is defined as a conflict that occurs within a 
state between a government and non-government forces. To meet classification 
requirements, the government must be actively involved in hostilities, both sides 
must effectively resist the other, and there must be a minimum of one thousand 
battlefield deaths. Civil war is dichotomous, and is coded one for the presence of 
civil war, and a zero otherwise. There are a total of 591 country years in which a 
civil war occurred (Sarkees, 2000). 
 The final control variable I employ focuses on war initiation (coded 
INITIATOR). The relative weakness and instability of anocracies when compared 
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to complete systems is not disputed here. This position makes anocratic systems 
an easy target for more powerful, complete regimes. By controlling for initiator, 
we can determine whether the conflict proneness of anocracies is actually a 
function of the regime type, or if anocratic systems simply make easy targets that 
are not necessarily more prone to conflict, but are attacked more often by 
complete systems. To control for initiator, I use the COW data. Here, initiator is 
classified as the state whose battalions made the first attack in force on the 
enemieʼs army or territory, rather than a measure of which state provoked the 
war. Since provocation is not necessarily captured by initiation, this measure is 
bound to miss some of the variation that I am interested in. However, excluding 
initiator could lead to omitted variable bias, and an issue with endogeneity, so I 
include it in the model, but concede that it is an imperfect measure.  Initiation is 
dichotomous, and is coded 0 if state i at time t is not the originator of war, and 1 if 
it is (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002a, 2005; Sarkees, 2000). 
 
6. THE RESULTS 
 I use cross section time series data to test my hypotheses. Since my 
dependent variable is dichotomous, random effects logistic regression is 
employed in all testing. To deal with any potential simultaneity bias (e.g. the 
onset of war leading a state to behave more autocratically), I lag my measures of 
institutionalization by one year. To address problems with autocorrelation, I 
include in my model, Mansfield and Snyderʼs natural spline function (with three 
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knots) of the number of years since state i last engaged in hostilities (Mansfield 
and Snyder, 2002a). In addition, there were several mixed regimes during World 
War I and World War II. Many of these mixed regimes became involved in 
hostilities, but in reality were only nominal participants. To ensure that these 
observations are not driving my results, I run an alternative model with them 
excluded as a robustness check (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002). To accomplish 
this exclusion process, all observations between 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 are 
dropped. In my base model, I have an n of 9,772 monadic country years, where 
war was observed in 398 country years. In my hypotheses test where the 
observations for major wars are excluded, I have an n of 9,193 monadic country 
years, and war was observed in 341 country years.  
 Based  on the results, reported below, it appears that neither of my 
hypotheses is supported, since my measure of institutionalization is not 
statistically significant. In regards to my controls, the variable for major powers 
has a positive significant coefficient regardless of whether the observations for 
major wars are excluded, which suggests that major powers are more likely to 
engage in war than lesser powers. My results also indicate that the presence of 
intrastate war has little effect on the outbreak on interstate hostilities. Finally, 
whether or not a state is the initiator of war appears to be unrelated to the 
outbreak of external war.  
 These results indicate that there is likely no relationship between 
institutionalization levels and a stateʼs propensity towards war, or a relationship 
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 Table 1: Logit Estimates of the Effects of Institutionalization on War 
 Base Model No Major Wars 
 
Institutionalization Levels 
 
-.0123 
(.0093) 
 
 
-.0076 
(.010) 
 
Institutionalization Levels Squared 
 
 
-.0019 
(.0019) 
 
 
-.0026 
(.002) 
 
Major Power 
 
 
1.497** 
(.229) 
 
 
1.456** 
(.246) 
 
Civil War 
 
 
.3646 
(.255) 
 
 
.4671 
(.257) 
 
Initiator 
 
 
.1429 
(.479) 
 
 
.3009 
(.483) 
 
Constant 
 
 
-3.557** 
(.174) 
 
 
-3.558** 
(.186) 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
** p .01 (two-tailed tests are conducted for all estimates) 
*  p .05 (two-tailed tests are conducted for all estimates) 
 
 
 between democratization levels and war. Obviously, the implications of 
null results in this context raises serious questions about the validity of much of 
the theories that helped to inform my own, specifically those dealing with the 
bellicose nature of mixed regimes as a function of weak political institutions, and 
those supporting the monadic democratic peace.  
 It would be hasty, however, to write off an entire literature based on my 
single hypotheses test, especially since there is a chance that my model was 
! 
"
! 
"
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poorly specified. In other words, I still believe that my theory (and those used to 
help justify it) is sound, but I have failed to capture the variation in 
institutionalization levels that I am interested in.  
 I start by specifying a second model. First, to measure institutionalization, I 
use the concentration of domestic authority (coded DOMAUTHORITY), an index 
created by Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore, and employed by Mansfield and Snyder in 
their research on mixed regimes. The domestic concentration of authority index is 
measured on an eleven-point scale, and measures the degree to which domestic 
authority is concentrated in the central government of state i. Domestic 
concentration increases as  “political participation is regulated or restricted in 
accordance with institutionalized procedures, executive recruitment is regulated, 
the chief executive is either designated in accordance with institutionalized 
procedures or chosen through competitive elections, the chief executive faces 
few constraints on his or her authority, this executive does not depend on some 
group (like a junta or cabinet) for his or her authority, and authority is 
concentrated in the central government, and local and regional governments 
have little independent authority” (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002a, pg. 315; Gurr et. 
al., 1989; pg. 39-40). As state i approaches 10 on this scale, it becomes more 
complete and has higher levels of institutionalization.  
 I could simply run a model using this measure as my independent 
variable, and assume that states with a low domestic authority score are less 
complete or incomplete anocracies, and states with higher scores are complete 
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democracies and autocracies. This was, after all, the approach I employed earlier 
in my first test. However, after some consideration, I now believe that 
differentiating between regime types is necessary. Since, theoretically, I am 
interested in how war proneness varies across different regime types (e.g. 
between less complete and incomplete anocracy) it makes good methodological 
sense to distinguish between them. Obviously, by doing this I am “delinking” my 
previous imperfect association between regime type and institutionalization (the 
assumption that as institutionalization levels increase or decrease, so does a 
states “completeness”). I believe that this “delinking” will allow me to more 
accurately capture the variation in institutionalization that I am interested in, 
which will make for a stronger hypotheses test.  
 In order to differentiate between regime types I use the composite regime 
scores, which are disaggregated into a series of dummy variables. 4 To capture 
variation across the full range of regime completeness and orientation, a total of 
six regime type measures are employed: democracy (DEMO), less complete 
democratic anocracy (LCDANOC), incomplete democratic anocracy (coded 
IDANOC), autocracy (AUTO), less complete autocratic anocracy (LCAANOC), 
and incomplete autocratic anocracy (IAANOC). Democracy is coded 1 for states 
with polity scores between 7 and 10, less complete democratic anocracy is coded 
1 for states with polity scores between 4 and 6, autocracy is coded 1 for states 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   4.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  these	  regime	  measures	  are	  simply	  a	  means	  to	  distinguish	  between	  regime	  types,	  and	  are	  in	  no	  way	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  measure	  of	  institutionalization.	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with polity scores between -7 and -10, and less complete autocratic anocracy is 
coded 1 for states with polity scores between -4 and -6.  
 In regards to the incomplete measures, disaggregating the data is a bit 
more complicated since zero falls between the two incomplete dummies 
(composite scores are measured on a scale from -10 to 10). To overcome this I 
use the Polity iV datasets measure of the openness of executive recruitment to 
divide the composite scores of 0 between my two dummy variables for 
incomplete systems. I chose executive recruitment for two reasons. First, it is 
considered by Mansfield and Snyder to be one of the three most important 
measures of institutionalization when examining the relationship between weak 
political institutions and war, and second, because this measure clearly 
distinguishes more autocratic states from more democratic states (Mansfield and 
Snyder, 2002a; 2002b; 2005). Executive recruitment is measured on a four point 
scale where a 1 indicates that chief executives are either selected through 
hereditary secession or seize power (autocracy), 2 indicates hereditary secession 
and the selection of a chief minister by either the executive or the courts 
(autocratic anocracy), 3 indicates hereditary secession and a elected chief 
minister (democratic anocracy), and 4 indicates that executives are selected by 
competitive elections, elite designation, or transitional arrangements (democracy) 
(Gurr et.al.,1989). Incomplete democratic anocracies are therefore coded 1 for 
states with polity scores between 0 and 3, when states coded 0 have an 
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executive recruitment score of 3 or 4. Incomplete autocratic anocracies are coded 
1 for states with polity scores between 0 and -3, when states coded 0 have an  
executive recruitment score of 1 or 2. 5 
 Thus far, I have introduced a new measure of institutionalization, and 
developed six measures of regime type. In my theoretical justification, I argue 
that state i will be more war prone when state i posses relatively weaker political 
institutions, and more complete systems will tend to have higher levels of 
institutionalization. Since a state will be more likely to engage in hostilities when it 
posses weak political institutions, I interact my regime measures with the 
concentration of domestic authority.  
   Based on my new measures of institutionalization, I estimate 
the following model: 
 
€ 
Warit = α + β1DEMOi( t−1) + β2LCDANOCi( t−1) + β3IDANOCi( t−1) +
β4LCAANOCi( t−1) + β5IAANOCi( t−1) + β6DOMAUTHORITYi( t−1) +
β7DEMO*DOMAUTHORITYi( t−1) + β8LCDANOC *DOMAUTHORITYi( t−1) +
β9IDANOC *DOMAUTHORITYi( t−1) + β10LCAANOC *DOMAUTHORITYi( t−1) +
β11IAANOC *DOMAUTHORITYi( t−1) + β12Majpowerit + β13Civwarit + β14Initiatorit +ε it
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   5.	  Since	  I	  am	  interested	  not	  only	  in	  the	  conflict	  proneness	  of	  mixed	  regimes	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  other,	  but	  whether	  or	  not	  these	  regimes	  will	  be	  less	  conflict	  prone	  if	  they	  fall	  more	  towards	  the	  democratic	  side	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum	  (the	  monadic	  democratic	  peace),	  I	  chose	  my	  dummy	  for	  autocracy	  as	  the	  reference	  variable.	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 Based on the results of my new models, reported below, it appears that 
there is still no relationship between the level of institutionalization in a state, and 
its propensity towards war. In addition, the relationship between democratization 
levels and war is also challenged (the monadic democratic peace). Before 
moving on with this discussion, first a little more about the results.  
 In both my base model and in my robustness test where major wars are 
excluded, the coefficients for democracy and less complete autocratic anocracy 
are both negative and non-significant, while the coefficients for the rest of my 
regime measures are positive and non-significant. Both models also indicate that 
my measure of institutionalization (concentration of domestic authority), and all of 
the interactions between this measure and my regime type dummy variables are 
not significant. Once again, my variable for major powers is positive and 
significant regardless of whether observations for major wars are dropped 
Finally, both civil war and war initiation still appear to be unrelated to a states 
propensity towards war.  
 That my model indicates a null relationship between institutionalization 
levels across regime type and a states propensity towards war carries with it 
serious implications. First, my theory was derived in large part from previous 
scholarship on mixed regimes (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder, Gates, and Rose and 
Shin just to name a few). Methodologically, I used Mansfield and Snyderʼs data, 
and my hypotheses test was, in part, based on their model. However, despite the  
similarities in theory and methods, Mansfield and Snyder are interested in the 
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Table 2: Logit Estimates of War Proneness Across Regime Type using Domestic 
Authority to Measure Institutionalization Levels. 
 Base Model No Major Wars 
 
Democracy 
 
-2.047 
(2.44) 
-2.554 
(2.65) 
 
Less complete democratic anocracy 
 
-1.311 
(2.67) 
-1.561 
(2.85) 
 
Incomplete democratic anocracy 
 
-.7686 
(2.52) 
-1.147 
(2.73) 
 
Less complete autocratic anocracy 
 
-2.06 
(2.49) 
-2.394 
(2.71) 
 
Incomplete autocratic anocracy 
 
-1.50 
(2.49) 
-1.71 
(2.7) 
 
Democracy*Domestic authority 
 
.2786 
(.434) 
.3864 
(.481) 
 
Less complete democratic anocracy* 
Domestic authority 
 
 
.1316 
(.468) 
.2155 
(.511) 
 
Incomplete democratic anocracy* 
Domestic authority 
 
 
.0666 
(.454) 
.1662 
(.5) 
 
Less complete autocratic anocracy* 
Domestic authority 
 
 
.2926 
(.443) 
.390 
(.489) 
 
Incomplete autocratic anocracy* 
Domestic authority 
 
 
.2111 
(.443) 
.2711 
(.491) 
 
Concentration of domestic authority 
 
-.1979 
(.431) 
-.2746 
(.479) 
 
Major power 
 
1.53** 
(.232) 
1.471** 
(.248) 
 
Civil war 
 
.3366 
(.283) 
.4083 
(.286) 
 
Initiator 
 
.2731 
(.481) 
.4165 
(.486) 
 
Constant 
 
-2.134 
(2.43) 
-1.862 
(2.64) 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
** p
€ 
≤.01 (two-tailed tests are conducted for all estimates) 
*  p
€ 
≤.05 (two-tailed tests are conducted for all estimates) 
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effects that regime transitions have on the outbreak of war (a dynamic concept), 
while I am testing the relationship between institutionalization and war (a static  
concept). Also, in my theory I differentiate between mixed regimes and focus on 
the variation among them, and the aforementioned theories focus on anocratic 
systems in the aggregate and their bellicose nature in relation to complete 
democratic and autocratic states. Although my results conflict with the previous 
mainstream findings, we cannot necessarily say that they are discredited, 
because of these differences. That said, my results do raise some questions over 
the validity of these works, since they view mixed regimes as typically more 
bellicose due to their lack of institutionalization. On this basis, it appears that the 
impacts of the strength of political institutions has likely been overstated. Before 
we can dismiss this association outright, additional testing is needed.  
 In regards to my second hypothesis, the results suggest that a stateʼs 
orientation towards democracy or autocracy has little bearing on war proneness 
for two reasons. First, none of my measures of regime type are significant. If 
democratic states were truly more pacific in their interstate relations (the monadic 
democratic peace) than we would, at the very least, expect an inverse significant  
relationship between my measure of democracy and war. Second, my results 
also indicate that institutionalization levels are not directly related to war. Since 
democratic institutions are often used to explain the more pacific nature of  
democratic states, and I find that political institutions have little effect on a stateʼs  
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war proneness, the validity of the monadic peace is challenged. 6 However, due 
to disparities in testing, and since the monadic democratic peace is also 
explained as a function of democratic culture and norms, additional testing is 
needed before we draw any conclusions. 7 
 
7. Conclusions 
 In this article I have attempted to link a stateʼs propensity towards war to 
the strength of its political institutions and resulting system stability. While 
previous research suggests that this association explains much of the variation in 
war likelihood, my results indicate that the level of institutionalization in a state 
has little, if any, impact. Obviously, this has significant implications for past 
research, raising questions about the validity of theories dealing with this 
relationship.  
 While I believe that I have successfully captured the variation in 
institutionalization that I am interested in, certain data limitations cannot be 
overlooked. For starters, war is a relatively rare phenomenon, which makes 
statistical testing difficult, since there is little in the dependent variable. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   6.	  These	  results	  also	  suggest	  that	  the	  dyadic	  democratic	  peace	  may	  not	  be	  as	  robust	  as	  previous	  scholarship	  suggest.	  However,	  since	  I	  use	  monads	  as	  my	  unit	  of	  analysis,	  the	  implications	  of	  my	  results	  on	  the	  dyadic	  democratic	  peace	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  as	  evidence	  against	  the	  relationship.	  Additional	  testing	  employing	  dyadic	  data	  is	  needed	  prior	  to	  forming	  any	  conclusions.	  	  	   7.	  While	  only	  two	  separate	  hypotheses	  tests	  are	  included	  in	  this	  article,	  others	  were	  performed	  as	  a	  robustness	  check.	  To	  verify	  my	  results,	  I	  have	  also	  run	  models	  using	  only	  my	  regime	  measures,	  and	  only	  my	  measure	  of	  domestic	  authority.	  I	  have	  also	  run	  models	  with	  and	  without	  the	  lags	  and	  three-­‐knot	  natural	  spline	  function.	  In	  every	  test	  that	  I	  have	  run,	  the	  results	  have	  remain	  unchanged.	  	  
	   	  
	  
28	  
addition, many variables are imperfectly and in many cases, arbitrarily measured. 
For example, the measure of war initiation employed in this article classifies 
initiator as the state whose battalions made the first attack in force on the 
opposing sides army or territory. Obviously, a measure of initiation that focused 
on which side actually provoked the war would be more substantively meaningful, 
and methodologically useful in this context.  
 While current data may be limited, it is clear that my hypotheses tests 
indicate that the strength of political institutions appears less important than 
previous research suggests. While both of my models suggest that institutions 
may not matter in this context, my second model also indicates that war 
proneness does not vary by regime type, which raises questions about the 
validity of the monadic democratic peace. Taken together, these results lead me 
to ask, which factors do contribute to a stateʼs propensity towards war? Since the 
relationship between stability and war was not directly tested here, should we 
consider regime durability as a potential explanation? Obviously, additional 
testing of this relationship, and of the theories linking war likelihood to political 
institutions, and those dealing with the monadic democratic peace, is needed.  
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